Abstract: This article discusses the factors shaping contemporary reclamation regimes in the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, northern Labrador, and Nunavik in northern Quebec. It distils policy documents, laws, research reports, and newspaper articles for a clear overview of current policy and practice in the North and shows that no overarching vision informs reclamation planning. Instead of direction from Ottawa, responsibility for policy-making now largely sits with provincial, territorial, and regional governments along with local land and water boards. Efforts to mitigate the impacts of new and legacy mines are complicated by the highly site-and case-specific nature of reclamation; the lack of a clear, ambitious technical and regulatory definition of reclamation; and the jurisdictional overlap and governance issues associated with cleanup. Addressing these wider policy challenges in the North is crucial to meet the expansive, expensive demands of mine reclamation. As well, remediation efforts that draw on traditional knowledge and encourage local involvement can mitigate and manage some of the worst impacts of northern resource development. Policy reform such as strengthened regulations and more rigorous government enforcement will help facilitate this. However, reclamation can also exacerbate inequality and environmental problems. Effective reclamation demands more than a particular technological fix or planning strategy; it involves a candid discussion of the goals and limitations of reclamation projects, both past and present. This article has been summarized in an accessible up-todate poster and will be of interest to concerned parties grappling with a plethora of reclamation regulatory bodies and programs.
In late 2013, a journalist trying to clarify just who was responsible for reclaiming Nunavut's Jericho diamond mine threw up her hands in frustration, characterizing the case as a jurisdictional "hot potato." 1 The mine stopped operating a few years after its 2004 opening and the site has since yukoncollege.yk.ca/review become mired in legal limbo, with reclamation work that will cost millions of dollars left incomplete. 2 Jericho is not unique; thousands of abandoned and orphaned mines and exploration sites are scatt ered across Canada, many of them in the North. 3 Their troubling legacies include heavy metal leaching, wildlife habitat loss, polluted rivers and drinking water, the disruption of migratory routes and traditional food sources, and long-term social strains in northern communities. 4 Reclamation has the potential to help mitigate these negative impacts and ensure that development does not leave northerners worse off . Given that the federal government must spend nearly $7 billion to reclaim contaminated sites and that two abandoned northern mines (Giant in the Northwest Territories and Faro in the Yukon) top this list at $1.6 billion, the magnitude of these problems is appreciated even in distant Ott awa. 5 Still, Jericho Mine's ongoing troubles are particularly disturbing given that politicians, bureaucrats, and industry representatives often diff erentiate between two periods of Canadian mining: an earlier era of regulatory laxness and limited reclamation, and its modern, enlightened counterpart from the 1980s onwards. 6 The former spawned disastrous inheritances: unremediated legacy mines, including orphaned or abandoned mines whose owners' bankruptcy or dissolution ensures that ownership reverts to the Crown. 7 The latt er embraces technological innovations and cradle-to-grave planning, cementing reclamation's central role. However, recent mine abandonments, like Jericho or Yukon Zinc's Wolverine Mine, blur the line between these periods without a corresponding recognition of the problem by the government and the industry. 8 Much to northerners' frustration, abandoned mines and exploration sites continue to cause problems. 9 Att empts to resolve these challenges are complicated by a constantly evolving jurisdictional landscape that is shaped by modern land claims agreements and devolution.
The concern is that eff orts to address recently abandoned mines do not go far enough in their consideration of local conditions and the breadth of cumulative problems. To communities still coping with the enduring reclamation challenges of mine sites abandoned decades ago, contemporary reclamation still falls short of addressing their concerns. By bridging detailed assessments of environmental reform and contaminated site management 10 and historical scholarship, 11 this article asks how policy-making has responded to mine and mineral exploration reclamation challenges. It distils policy documents, laws, research reports, and newspaper articles for a clear overview of current mine reclamation in the North. This article will be of interest to concerned parties grappling with a plethora of reclamation regulatory bodies and programs, from general mining and environmental legislation to measures designed to address specifi c mine sites. In an eff ort Reclamation will not necessarily restore a site to its previous state. Some reclamation activities have actually stirred up contaminants, deepening community concerns about persistent environmental and health impacts. As John Sandlos and Arn Keeling write, potential redevelopment projects as well as the ongoing toxic legacies of mineral extraction revive the North's "zombie" mines so that true mine closure remains elusive. 15 Furthermore, the meaning of reclamation has changed over time. Rather than a task to be undertaken after operations cease, progressive reclamation strategies ensure that mitigation begins before an operation's offi cial opening. At its best, reclamation includes ambitious, holistic land use strategies, habitat planning, and the comprehensive treatment of contaminants beyond those in the mine's immediate vicinity. Technical solutions are only the start: eff ective reclamation entails sound environmental stewardship and policy planning spanning decades and even centuries. Each reclamation project is unique, diff erentiated by disparate environments, industrial processes and byproducts, community expectations and input, and time scales stretching over months, years, and decades-all within complicated histories of resource extraction. Thus reclaiming the Yukon's Faro Mine, with its many millions of tonnes of waste rock and wet tailings, demands considerably more time, money, and expertise than reclaiming a small mine exploration site home to a half-dozen abandoned fuel barrels and a small area of contaminated soil.
When surveying the multitude of contemporary reclamation requirements, it is worth remembering that until the late 1970s and early 1980s, mining companies operated within a Canadian legal framework that was "open, straightforward, democratic, and encouraging," which is to say, deeply favourable to them and often inatt entive to environmental concerns. 16 But by the late 1980s, sustained Aboriginal and sett ler activism, often in opposition to particular projects, led to more proactive (albeit still fragmentary) environmental policy-making as well as a greater recognition of Aboriginal land rights and the duty to consult with Aboriginal communities. 17 Public unease about the social and environmental impacts of mining across Canada spurred companies to seek social licence for their extractive activities, most notably through the 1992 Whitehorse Mining Initiative (WMI). 18 Led by the president of the Mining Association of Canada and culminating in a multi-stakeholder accord in 1994, the WMI involved various levels of governments, environmental organizations, organized labour, and some Aboriginal groups such as the Inuit Tapirisat. 19 Together, stakeholders collaboratively addressed concerns, including abandoned mines, securities reform, and mine remediation approaches. As Mary Louise McAllister and Cynthia Jacqueline Alexander show in their comprehensive study of the WMI, the initiative led to several direct and indirect changes for both legacy and new mines. Natural Resources Canada took on a more proactive role, and the federal government made an eff ort to bring additional departments into mining regulation and oversight processes. 20 Collaborative research and development initiatives, such as the Mine Environmental Neutral Drainage (from 1989 onwards), the Canada Centre for Mineral and Environmental Technology (CanMET), and, more recently, the Green Mining Initiative, complemented these eff orts.
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WMI's implementation and reach was uneven, however, and fragmented by the same jurisdictional silos it was created to address. Newfoundland and Labrador was not a signatory to the agreement, leaving Labrador's Aboriginal groups with few options, while the Yukon's government only adopted WMI provisions that were favourable to industry. Junior mining companies were largely left out of the process. 22 Eff orts to improve regulations for newer mines also had their limitations: new legislation in the 1980s and 1990s across Canada requiring mine reclamation plans were stymied by a cap on the amount of required securities, leading to liability outstripping submitt ed funds.
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The Current Regimes
In Canada, multiple levels of government now inform northern reclamation policies: legislative bodies (provincial and territorial legislatures and the Canadian Parliament); the executive (provincial, territorial, and federal cabinets and bureaucracies); the judiciary (courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada and tribunals); and regional governments and agencies that have gained authority over land use policies through modern treaty-making. In theory, national guidelines for pollution releases and health standards crafted by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) and federal laws sett ing out pollution release standards mediate reclamation eff orts. 24 However, the provinces, and increasingly the territories, wield the majority of regulatory power over reclamation. There is no comprehensive, nationally accepted Canadian law for mine reclamation. Rather than a single reclamation "regime" there are multiple regimes. These are in turn embedded in and refl ective of diff erent northern contexts. As fi gure 1 illustrates, reclamation is shaped by a mixed bag of legislation, regulations interpreting these laws, permitt ing and licensing systems, environmental review processes, and diverse guidelines and programs. 25 All of these laws off er both opportunities and obstacles for mine remediation.
Four questions can help identify relevant regulations and programs for particular mines, as well as how quickly reclamation will occur. A readily identifi ed jurisdictional authority does not guarantee the site will actually be reclaimed, of course. As many northerners well know, simply because a political body is legally responsible does not mean that it will clean up the site. The four questions are: Canadian environmental laws and planning guidelines, the "polluter pays" principle requires that parties responsible for pollution fund and carry out reclamation. This means that mining companies are expected to reclaim tailings ponds and other disturbances. 31 In practice, these expectations have not always been met. As bankrupt mining companies abandoned the remains of exploration activities and mining operations on northern Crown land, the reclamation of these sites fell to federal departments and taxpayers. Joseph F. Castrilli, a legal scholar, argues that the Canadian legal regime "implicitly presume[s] that orphaned/ abandoned mines, sites which by defi nition have no responsible person," do not exist and cannot be created. Consequently, newer land use planning and mine licensing instruments are rarely applicable to these sites. 32 In some cases, mining companies have stepped up to reclaim sites abandoned by other proponents. For example, Royal Oak Mines' bankruptcy in 1999 left the Colomac gold mine abandoned and unremediated. Aboriginal Aff airs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC, formerly Indian and Northern Aff airs Canada) and Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) hired Aboriginal companies to carry out much of the necessary $135 million remediation work, and Merc International Minerals Inc. paid a security deposit for the reclamation of three nearby exploration sites before reopening the mine in 2011. 33 Miners and prospectors have likewise independently stepped up to clean abandoned sites in an eff ort to remediate lands like Snowfi eld's abandoned exploration site near Drybones Bay. 34 
What mining activities took place and what sort of reclamation is required?
Mine reclamation includes everything from managing large tailings ponds to removing leftover explosives stockpiles. For newer mines, operators must keep abreast of these obstacles and send updated reclamation plans to the appropriate authority. Abandoned mines are assessed using the CCME's classifi cation system for contaminated sites,
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Dance | Northern Reclamation in Canada which determines a mine site's priority for reclamation eff orts-or whether it will be reclaimed at all. 35 Sites presenting major health hazards or environmental damage are sometimes (but not always) subject to an environmental review process and reclaimed more quickly. The nature and scale of mining activities helps determine which authorities will be involved in site cleanup. The presence of nuclear materials, for instance, ensures the involvement of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission at sites like the NWT's Port Radium.
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Answering these questions can be a frustrating undertaking. Whatever their origins, though, reclamation policies share some common elements such as planning requirements and tax-deductible securities (fi nancial sureties put forward by mining companies to guarantee money will be available for reclamation activities should the mining proponent go bankrupt).
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Federal Reclamation Programs in the North
Before turning to reclamation arrangements in each northern jurisdiction, it is worth discussing national programs applicable to legacy mine sites across the country. Although federal leadership was largely non-existent throughout the twentieth century, diff erent national reclamation initiatives for orphaned and abandoned sites began in the late 1980s. From 1989 to 1995, the CCME and the federal government's National Contaminated Sites Remediation Program (NCSRP) paid for the reclamation of forty-fi ve highrisk orphaned sites, created a classifi cation scheme based on environmental and human health impacts, and funded industry remediation technology trials. Environment Canada also helped federal departments study over 300 high-risk contaminated sites, fourteen of which were reclaimed. Despite the success of the NCSRP classifi cation system, federal-provincial friction, weak leadership, and funding cuts derailed the program's remediation eff orts and any enforceable legislation for contaminated sites. 38 Since NCSRP funding was allocated on a per capita basis, support for Yukon and NWT projects combined was less than Prince Edward Island's share. 39 While this program off ered only negligible advantages for the territories, other more specialized initiatives were being developed for the North. In 1991, AANDC's Northern Aff airs Program (NAP) began a Waste Management Program for assessing and remediating contaminated sites; abandoned mine reclamation made up a very small proportion of the program's overall budget. 40 The same year, the federal government's Green Plan created contaminants programs under the Arctic Environmental Strategy. Government departments removed fuel barrels from some sites and began remediation work at two Yukon mines. 41 By 1995, the Contaminated Sites Management Working Group (CSMWG) had developed an expansive interdepartmental strategy to address contaminated sites across the country.
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Despite this, there was still no substantial funding or overall strategy for abandoned mines and other contaminated sites.
By the late 1990s the scale of reclamation challenges could no longer be ignored: collapsing mineral prices had brought about a wave of private sector bankruptcies and mine abandonment, including the massive Faro and Giant operations. 43 Changes to federal accounting systems put contaminated sites on the books as contingent liabilities, a move that the Auditor General had repeatedly called for during the previous decade. Finally, Ott awa was overtly acknowledging its responsibility for thousands of contaminated sites across the country, many of which were created by mining activities. The government's liabilities translated into hefty additions to federal debt numbers, as did growing future care and maintenance costs. These could only be mitigated through reclamation. 44 Many of these sites were located in the North, where abandoned mine strategies in some places amounted to litt le more than "crisis management." 45 In 2002, the environmental commissioner questioned why federal authorities knew litt le about the health risks posed by hundreds of abandoned mines and other contaminated sites across the country. According to the commissioner, the government had not adequately studied, monitored, or remediated the sites; nor had it secured the stable funding necessary to achieve these goals. 46 Ott awa's response took the form of the Federal Contaminated Sites Inventory (FCSI), the Federal Contaminated Sites Action Plan (FCSAP), and the multi-stakeholder National Orphaned/Abandoned Mines Initiative (NOAMI). An advisory committ ee made up of mining groups, First Nations, NGOs, and governments, NOAMI began studying mine abandonment and associated Canadian regulatory reform in 2002. NOAMI has developed more than a dozen thorough guidance documents and studies on orphaned and abandoned mines in the North. 47 The federal government funds FCSI and FCSAP. While FCSI compiles data on contaminated sites, FCSAP supplies money and expertise to crown corporations and responsible departments (primarily AANDC in the north) to remediate them. 48 Established in 2005 through the Treasury Board Secretariat and $3.5 billion in dedicated funding, FCSAP is a rare example of a substantive fi nancial commitment for abandoned mines and other contaminated sites across Canada. Under FCSAP, the federal government accepts full responsibility for sites where pollution levels exceed national guidelines and pose health hazards to humans and the environment. 49 After the responsible federal agency or department determines the degree of site contamination, FCSAP provides training and funding for remediation through a prescribed step-by-step process. FCSAP makes abandoned mines and other contaminated sites visible to federal departments and agencies beyond those regulating natural resource extraction. But unlike the Superfund program in the United States, 50 FCSAP only applies to federal contaminated sites. Provincial, territorial, municipal, and private lands are not included in the program, and responsible parties must undertake site evaluation and fund reclamation without Ott awa's help. The program's commitment to paying the full costs of reclaiming the largest FCSI sites (notably Faro, Colomac, and Giant) is unprecedented in Canada. From 2005 to 2011 alone, FCSAP expenditures reached roughly $1.82 billion. 51 What's more, some of the funding allocated to FCSAP has bolstered older programs like the Northern Contaminated Sites Program (NCSP).
52 Operating in the territories, the NCSP has funded assessments of hundreds of sites. FCSAP money has helped the NCSP shift from basic care and maintenance concerns to more ambitious reclamation planning, consultations, and continuing monitoring. 53 Liability for NCSP sites reached $2.3 billion by 2013, more than half of which will go to reclaiming Faro and Giant. 54 The NCSP supports cost-eff ective management strategies that address health risks and that include First Nations, Inuit, and other northerners in the remediation process. 55 Until recently, the program was managed by one federal department (AANDC) and supported by another (PWGSC). While both departments are still involved, in the Yukon the NCSP takes its lead from the territorial government and regional authorities; arrangements for NCSP vary depending on the jurisdiction, stakeholder and Aboriginal involvement, and other factors.
Both FCSI and FCSAP (and, by extension, the NCSP) have their limitations. In 2012, the federal environment auditor noted that although government departments had taken measurable steps to rehabilitate some sites, hundreds remained and Canadians lacked "a clear picture" of their status and cost. 56 Two years later, the Parliamentary Budget Offi ce (PBO) found that the FCSI was inconsistent and hard to interpret. 57 It is not connected to other tools for tracking environmental problems like the National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI). For concerned northerners, it can amount to litt le more than a slow-to-load checklist of incomprehensible data. This is not terribly useful for communities trying to understand reclamation's progress. As the PBO and environment commissioner have pointed out, the government has neglected to include roughly 1,000 sites in the publicly accessible inventory because of unspecifi ed "security reasons." 58 The public inventory also neglects to explain why other sites were closed without any remediation. For FCSAP's part, funding is vulnerable to government cuts and changing policy priorities. It is not guaranteed in perpetuity. 59 As well, the costliest and most intensive reclamation projects (i.e., abandoned northern mines) threaten to eat up a large proportion of FCSAP funds. 60 The federal government is responsible for other substantive reclamation and rehabilitation programs across Canada in addition to mining reclamation-related legislation and FCSAP. These tend to have a very specifi c focus and include the Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (which provides for the management of nuclear legacy liabilities in Ontario and Quebec); shared-site funding and management of special projects, such as the Sydney tar ponds and coke ovens; and contaminated site cleanup on First Nation reserves through the Contaminated Sites Management Program.
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Territorial, Provincial, and Regional Reclamation
Each northern jurisdiction has a handful of standard regulatory elements that may potentially aff ect new mine reclamation. These include mining acts, regulations, and guidelines, many of which set out reclamation and security planning requirements. However, Canadian mining legislation focuses on assigning mineral rights and generally has litt le to say about environmental protection. 62 Instead, environmental legislation establishes pollution limits, discharge permit processes, cleanup authorities, and authorizes specifi c boards to carry out environmental assessments of projects and exploratory work. 63 As mentioned, water and land use acts also set out licensing and permitt ing requirements for reclamation-specifi c mining concerns. Workplace safety and land planning legislation likewise aff ect exploration, development, and site cleanup operations. Beyond FCSAP, regulations for legacy mines are scarcer. Some territorial and provincial governments have created special inter-jurisdictional or public-private collaborative agreements and programs to manage these sites. More often than not, these are funded directly through annual appropriations (one-time budget commitments) rather than statutory expenditures or industry contributions.
A handful of federal laws and regulations must be considered for new, ongoing, and future mine reclamation projects undertaken by other authorities, as well as for many remediation projects for legacy mines. Federal rules are divided between these sources according to environmental components, such as land or water. 64 Castrilli highlights other potentially relevant federal legislation for both new and legacy mines, including the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which gives trustees the power to sell assets and resolve liability, while sett ing out rules for remedying environmental damage. 65 The federal government's Minerals and Metals Policy also acknowledges jurisdictional divisions and emphasizes sustainability, Aboriginal involvement in planning, and safe mining practices within Canada and for companies operating abroad. 66 The federal government's role in mine reclamation in the North has diminished over the past decade. Across the territories, devolution has meant that lands and resources previously managed by departments like AANDC have been transferred to the applicable territorial or Aboriginal government. The Yukon underwent this transfer in 2003. Diff erent selfgovernment agreements and management boards, councils, and committ ees shape present-day reclamation requirements. The territory's Yukon Mine Site Reclamation and Closure Policy applies to modern-day mines, and the Yukon Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources oversees reclamation regulation for both quartz and placer mines. The Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Board is responsible for reviewing environmental impact statements in the territory except for those in the Inuvialuit Sett lement Area. 67 Alternative arrangements have been made for the Yukon's abandoned mines. The 2003 Devolution Transfer Agreement ensured that while the territorial government takes the lead in lands and resource management and other areas, AANDC retains fi nancial responsibility for "Abandoned Type II" mines, i.e., large abandoned mines requiring extensive remediation. 68 Thus the federal government funds the Faro Mine reclamation, and the territorial government, the Selkirk First Nation, and the Ross River Dena Council manage it jointly. 69 The NWT has its own evolving reclamation regime. On April 1, 2014 the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) became the central authority for land and resource management in the territory, although the federal government retained authority over some lands. 70 The Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board conducts environmental reviews for most lands in the NWT excepting those in the Inuvialuit Sett lement Area. 71 Companies seeking to build and operate a mine apply for water licences and land use permits from the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (MVLWB), which also requires reclamation plans and securities based on anticipated closure and reclamation costs. The MVLWB and AANDC recently revised guidelines for mine sites and advanced mineral exploration, which stress progressive reclamation and clear closure expectations, and detail key considerations for mine closure. 72 The MVLWB has also endorsed AANDC's Mine Site Reclamation Policy for the Northwest Territories on an interim basis and will soon have completed its own policy framework. 73 In the recent past, reclamation has featured prominently in the mining approvals process: proponents operating the NWT's fi rst diamond mines were required to set out clear, progressive reclamation goals and submit deposits. 74 More recently, during hearings leading up to the territory's fi nal devolution agreement, NWT residents expressed concern about repeating the mistakes that created Giant Mine. In response, the agreement devoted an entire chapter to "Waste Sites" (including lands aff ected by mineral, oil, and gas development), and it distinguishes between sites created before and after the transfer date. 75 Because of the diffi culties and expense involved in reclaiming Giant Mine, a separate co-operation agreement governs this project.
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Like the NWT, Nunavut has gained more authority over land and resource management; the Nunavut Mining Regulations, which were still in the process of being revised and reinterpreted in spring 2015, contain mine reclamation securities requirements. 77 New projects are reviewed by the Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB); if it approves the project's (likely revised) environmental impact statement, the NIRB issues a project certifi cate, while the federal government retains the authority to accept or reject its recommendation. 78 Projects are expected to abide by Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.'s Mining Policy, applicable to all Nunavut Sett lement Area lands, which calls for stability, harmonization with regional planning, protecting the local ecosystem, federal and territorial health and safety requirements, and continuity between disturbed and undeveloped lands. All "disturbed" lands must be reclaimed in "an environmentally sound manner" to "a safe, stable and productive condition." 79 Likewise, AANDC's Mine Site Reclamation Policy for Nunavut stresses community consultation, the "polluter pays" principle, and progressive reclamation. 80 According to a provision of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, proponents seeking to operate on Nunavut Sett lement Lands must negotiate an Inuit Impact and Benefi t Agreement with the appropriate Inuit authority. 81 The Nunavut Water Board issues licenses, while Inuit governments such as the Qikiqtani Inuit Association require mining companies undertaking exploration or development to submit an Abandonment and Reclamation Plan and fi nancial securities. 82 All of these measures shape new mine projects, including Agnico-Eagle's recently approved Meliadine gold mine near Rankin Inlet. 83 As in the NWT, legacy mines like the Roberts Bay silver mine and Rankin Inlet nickel and copper mine are reclaimed through the NCSP. The Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act grants AANDC the power to safeguard humans, property, and the environment, which in the case of the Jericho Mine involves assuming liability for the site. 84 Nunavik's mine site reclamation regime is shaped by a distinctive governance system: a regional government operating within the province of Quebec. 85 Reclamation requirements in northern Quebec were nearly non-existent prior to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of 1975. Since then, the Quebec government began requiring mining companies operating in Nunavik to report their exploration activities and post securities. Land claims and self-government agreements likely also encouraged industry proponents and government to seek Aboriginal buy-in and led to the fi rst-ever impact and benefi t agreement for the Raglan Mine in 1995. The same year, changes to the Mining Act required companies to prepare rehabilitation plans and submit fi nancial guarantees, while the Environment Quality Act requires reclamation plans, securities, and mining activities to operate according to environmental standards. 86 As G. Duhaime, N. Bernard, and R. Comtois write, Inuit and Naskapi hunters' reports of contaminated materials and dead animals at abandoned exploration sites spurred provincial intervention for older sites by the 1990s. 87 During this time, the Quebec government formed partnerships with Aboriginal communities and mining companies to reclaim such sites through the Ecological Mines Program (1993-97) and a restoration program for private abandoned sites . 88 More recently, the Kativik Regional Government, the provincial government and thirty mining companies' award-winning Fonds RestorAction Nunavik (2007-present) has supported local capacity building and employment through the reclamation of at least eighteen exploratory sites. 89 Unlike those in other jurisdictions, mine proponents that operated prior to these legislative changes can still be held responsible under the province's Mining Act for environmental damage and remediation at Quebec mines.
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In northern Labrador, which includes the traditional Inuit territory of Nunatsiavut, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador and regional Aboriginal authorities are primarily responsible for mine reclamation policies. Newfoundland and Labrador's Mineral Act, Mining Act, and associated regulations set out requirements for mine rehabilitation planning and reporting and allow the provincial government to step in and use securities to undertake rehabilitation if necessary, while the Environment Protection Act gives the minister discretionary approval for reclamation. 91 Castrilli notes that Newfoundland and Labrador's environmental laws explicitly allow the government to "impose levies and establish a fund" for contaminated site remediation. However, since no government has moved to use these powers, the fate of many of the province's more than seventy abandoned mines remains uncertain. 92 Land claims agreements have also informed reclamation policies for newer mines. Aboriginal involvement is worth underlining since it came about after northern Labrador's Indigenous communities challenged their exclusion from mineral development decisions aff ecting their lands. 93 The
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Mapping Reclamation Reforms
Canada's historic dependence on natural resource development as well as close ties between industry and various levels of government have produced a weak record of environmental regulation and enforcement. 95 Instead of a comprehensive national approach, the strongest components of reclamation policy-making were developed in response to environmental groups' complaints and community advocacy. 96 As Wenig and O'Reilly persuasively argued in their 2005 review of NWT mine remediation regulations, there is no true Canadian reclamation "regime," as this word implies a coherence and integration wholly absent from current requirements. 97 Few reclamation requirements are binding or fi rmly prescriptive. Instead, they are characterized by an "ambiguous applicability and functional relation to each other" and undermined by feeble enforcement, monitoring, and review capacities within government. 98 Information and data are fragmented according to the source of pollution or jurisdiction authority. Table 1 lists the components of this uneven patchwork and divides policies and programs according to basic jurisdictional responsibility. The relative success of reclamation eff orts depends less on current overlapping, poorly enforced rules, and guidelines than on the case-by-case practices of mine stakeholders and regulators. 99 
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Dance | Northern Reclamation in Canada How might this system be reformed? Calls for "clarity" within policy planning documents seem justifi ed given the sheer diversity of overlapping rules and policies, especially from the perspective of governments struggling to att ract investment to help fund social services and infrastructure. 100 However, clarity around mining regulation is frequently a euphemism for streamlining and weakening regulatory frameworks. Wenig and O'Reilly instead call for a fi rmer, "more holistic or comprehensive and streamlined reclamation regime" that considers all environmental impacts. 101 In particular, improving cumulative impact assessment mechanisms involves considering diff erent ecosystem components within environmental reviews and eff ects beyond those directly related to the proposed project. 102 Wenig and O'Reilly set out detailed prescriptions for such a reclamation policy in the NWT (many of which are currently being implemented), and these could equally apply elsewhere in the North. 103 As well, Castrilli prescribes a series of legislative reforms for the Canadian reclamation regime, with stronger enforcement and funding. 104 Castrilli makes a case for creating a statutory authority to hasten mine site cleanup and ensure stable and consistent support for reclamation through the establishment of committ ed Orphaned/ Abandoned Mine Cleanup Funds. 105 Another consideration for reform involves all levels of government affi rming (or reaffi rming) the goals of reclamation. Currently, national environmental quality guidelines informing reclamation are incomplete and far from "holistic benchmarks" for human health and the environment, so how can reclamation itself be trusted? 106 The North would be bett er served by embedding the precautionary principle (operating in ways that prevent harm, be it health-related, psychological, or environmental) into reclamation regulations. In the NWT, for example, the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board has rejected projects because they did not meet the precautionary principle. However, the board is under no legal obligation to do so. 107 
Reclamation Reform in a Northern Context
Truly eff ective northern reclamation reform also involves tackling broader diffi culties facing northern communities and governments. Frances Abele stresses that northern people in Canada confront three major challenges: fi nding ways to make their evolving governance arrangements work, developing their economy in sustainable ways, and dramatically improving local well-being. 108 The limitations and failures of current reclamation policy and practice exemplify all of these challenges.
First, devolution is both a boon and burden for current and future reclamation eff orts. Devolution and m odern treaty-making have created new political and institutional co-management arrangements in the North, many of which directly aff ect mining policy and provide leverage for increased recognition of Aboriginal land use rights-and Aboriginal control over their lands. At a time when federal action is not forthcoming, Aboriginal agencies promise stronger reclamation leadership. For example, the Wek'èezhìi Land and Water Board recently pressured the NWT government to ensure Dominion Diamonds pays the entire security deposit for its Ekati diamond mine. The board was also responsible for tripling the required deposit. 109 In December 2012, the Ross River Dena Council used the courts to successfully challenge free entry (mining proponents' unrestricted access to their lands for exploration activities), contesting this manifestation of lingering sett ler colonialism. 110 And in Nunatsiavut, the Inuit government will not approve mine exploration activities without explicit consent-and fi rm comprehensive reclamation planning, baseline data collection, and wildlife protection. 111 If devolution provides openings for Aboriginal expectations to be interpreted not simply as mine reclamation guidelines but enforceable, non-negotiable standards, then the North might off er opportunities for tougher, more imaginative reclamation strategies than any undertaken in southern Canada.
That said, devolution is not a comprehensive panacea for improved reclamation standards: new and emerging authorities (such as land and water boards) charged with issuing licenses and assessing mine closure planning suff er from major capacity defi cits in keeping with limitations across the North. 112 In other words, there are not enough trained people to plan, carry out, and oversee reclamation enforcement, monitoring, and reviews. Nor is there enough money to support these eff orts. The responsibilities of new northern regulatory authorities sometimes overlap, leading to further diffi culties. 113 Territorial-federal relationships can be fraught, and Aboriginal groups have recently contested Ott awa's att empt to centralize the NWT's local resource oversight boards. 114 The GNWT is still sorting out land management and reclamation governance structures, while land use planning in the Yukon's Peel watershed is caught between development and habitat protection. 115 In Nunavut, incomplete regional land use plans unhelpfully intersect with the territory's project approval process. 116 At the same time, the NIRB's powers are limited to issuing reclamation licenses and other conditions; it cannot enforce these requirements, and lacks the power to punish companies (such as Jericho's operators) that fail to meet them. 117 Ott awa can still dismiss Nunavummiat concerns about large-scale extractive projects, including the proposed Ekati diamond mine expansion in the NWT.
Equally troubling is the NWT government's willingness to accept delayed or unconventional forms of mine securities for current operations, a practice that has been contested by Aboriginal land and water boards and a member of the NWT legislative assembly. 119 Throughout the North, mine securities are weakly enforced, incorrectly calculated, and inconsistently collected; they provide only inadequate protection in cases of mine abandonment, and measures in place to track these funds are few and largely inaccessible to the public. 120 At the Nanisivik lead/zinc mine in Nunavut, for example, reclamation costs became a contentious issue, with AANDC's estimates being three times those of the proponent. 121 The Pembina Institute has underlined Alberta's ineff ectual oil sands reclamation security deposit regime, 122 and a comparable study of contemporary mine securities is needed given that reclamation costs can rise as much as 73% for some major FCSAP projects. 123 Thus, although devolution has created new arrangements for natural resource management, these are not necessarily eff ective. Nor is support from Ott awa forthcoming: the federal government has undermined the environmental assessment process and important legislation such as the Fisheries Act, even as it has vilifi ed its critics and promoted northern resource extraction at the expense of environmental protection.
124 Some opportunities for individuals and organizations seeking answers and information from the federal government on environmental issues remain, such as the environmental registry and the environmental petitions process; Alternatives North eff ectively used the latt er to raise awareness about Giant Mine in 2013. 125 However, leadership within the federal government on contaminated site policy reform is elusive, particularly in the wake of the 2012 dissolution of the National Round Table on the Environment  and the Economy (NRTEE). 126 Key federal departments have only weakly implemented a comprehensive sustainability strategy. 127 NOAMI, too, has struggled to overcome fragmentary jurisdictional divisions. 128 Agencies tasked with reviewing federal reclamation policies like the environment commissioner and the PBO are constrained by their mandates in that their reviews are primarily limited to assessing program spending. 129 Thus while northern agencies and governments struggle with inadequate staff and funding, the federal government has seemingly divested itself of any fi rm role in reclamation leadership outside of FCSAP, and continued devolution will only reinforce this patt ern.
The North's second challenge, achieving sustainable economic development, also resonates with reclamation policy's limitations and opportunities. It is diffi cult to overstate the importance placed on mineral development in northern places. Recent debates around uranium mining in Nunavut illustrate the contentious nature of discussions taking place across the North. 130 For those expressing reservations about the social, economic, and environment legacies of increased mineral exploration, reclamation's challenges loom large, especially since mining is far from a sustainable activity. 131 Eff ective reclamation involves monitoring and treating tailings that leach toxins decades or even centuries after mine closure. Despite this, management and governance regimes in Canada generally lack laws and regulations for perpetual care, i.e., providing management and mitigation for contamination that cannot be repaired within the next few centuries given existing technology. Stewardship and emergency response plans are inadequate, while environmental assessment processes inconsistently address "broader questions of sustainability, equity, need for proposed projects, and life cycle analyses." 132 Modern reclamation approaches like adaptive management have become "euphemism[s] for stumbling along, and keeping costs to a minimum." 133 The narrowness of the current reclamation framework is particularly evident at sites with substantive long-term issues. The Giant Mine remediation project epitomizes the most extreme challenges, for the gold mine operations left behind 237,000 tons of toxic arsenic trioxide dust. AANDC's fi rst proactive response involved fi nding a private owner to take over the site while continuing to pay the majority of environmental maintenance costs. A more recent technological solution advanced through the environmental review process involves burying and freezing the arsenic underground. 134 As reclamation practices continue to evolve, policy-makers must consider how such legacies will aff ect future generations. 135 One way to ensure northern communities actively benefi t from these troubling generational impacts is to guarantee them jobs, training, and lead roles in reclamation. In Cape Breton, Aboriginal set-asides (contracts specifi cally reserved for the bids of First Nations) for work on the Sydney Tar Ponds Remediation Project gave local Mi'kmaq the chance to demonstrate and expand their expertise in land reclamation, leading to other opportunities and industry partnerships. 136 Aboriginal set-asides are required for many government contracts across Canada, including the North, where remediation projects continue to generate millions of dollars of economic activity. 137 The community of Faro has reoriented itself around mine closure in place of mineral extraction, with the Faro Mine closure plan stressing that mitigation activities and monitoring would take centuries, thereby "providing jobs for Yukoners as active stewards of the land for generations to come." 138 Despite this, some Aboriginal peoples, such as those in the Kaska Nation, have been frustrated by their exclusion from reclamation activities (in this case, the Faro closure). 139 Achieving northern sustainable economic resource development means more than hiring northerners for reclamation, however; it also involves incorporating traditional knowledge into policy and practice. During the past two decades, governments increasingly recognized the value of community interventions; initiatives like NOAMI and Parks Canada remediation eff orts funded through FCSAP incorporate, at least nominally, local knowledge provisions. 140 Diff erent forms of local knowledge have expedited and improved reclamation. This was the case during a Parks Canada cleanup at Ivvavik, where Inuvialuit elders who had worked at the DEW Line site helped scientists distinguish between natural features and potentially contaminated land. 141 That said, the mandated integration of local knowledge into mine planning has not addressed every local concern, particularly those related to loss of "spirit of place" incurred by contamination and pollution. 142 Too often, Traditional Knowledge (TK) is pigeonholed within policy-making and remediation planning. 143 Sound and enduring reclamation means re-establishing functioning ecosystems that are valued and used by locals while affi rming consultation and consent as core features of the environmental review process. It also involves integrating TK into site cleanup and mining. At Drybones Bay, NWT, the site of sacred Yellowknives Dene hunting and fi shing grounds, burial grounds, and historic villages, TK considerations led to the rejection of a mineral exploration application in 2004. 144 More recently, during the environmental review process for the Meliadine Mine, the Kivalliq Inuit Association (KIA) identifi ed gaps in Agnico-Eagle's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), showing that the company had neglected to integrate TK in caribou conservation. By ignoring these considerations, the KIA warned, the company risked remaining ignorant of the long-term environmental changes incurred by the new gold mine. 145 In the North and across southern Canada, there is a need for a new conversation about the goals and aims of reclamation and how TK should shape them. For example, does "reclamation" refer to a return to pre-extraction landscapes, or is its aim to mitigate the worst pollution problems and ensure specifi c human activities can go forward? How should reclamation planning incorporate Aboriginal hunting and fi shing needs? Northern residents deserve a greater debate about what has been achieved-and what is achievable.
The fi nal pressing northern challenge involves improving community well-being. This too, mirrors ongoing reclamation dilemmas, especially those relating to knowledge and information sharing. A growing number of tools provide guidance for communities contemplating the long-term challenges of reclamation in the North. These include plain-language overviews of the various review processes, agreements, and remediation activities. 146 A new project around Yellowknife's Giant Mine, for instance, includes forums and community-led displays to communicate with future generations about the long-term storage of arsenic trioxide. 147 Still, straightforward information on the transportation and management of toxic materials and other aspects of the reclamation process is not easy to fi nd in Canada. Endemic institutional "structural secrecy" within government departments responsible for managing and regulating contamination further exacerbates public anxieties. 148 Community well-being likewise resonates with the environmental justice dilemmas underlying mine remediation histories. Mineral development in Canada is based on free mining, a system that privileges proponents' goals over community rights and equality. 149 No matt er how sophisticated they may seem, reclamation strategies follow profound historical injustices that marginalized northern people and created enduring environmental problems in their lands. 150 Those who laud the cost-eff ectiveness and engineering fi nesse of particular technological solutions often miss the point. Reclaiming Giant Mine, for example, involves more than reclaiming asbestos, soils contaminated with hydrocarbons, abandoned buildings, or even managing hundreds of thousands of tons of arsenic trioxide. Locals continue to ask that other aspects of Giant's legacy be considered, especially the Yellowknives Dene children poisoned by the mine's operations. 151 Reconsidering reclamation in terms of well-being refl ects the reality that site cleanup is only one part of a complicated northern mining history. While heritage organizations nostalgically portray former mine sites as the harbinger of northern modernity, Aboriginal communities refl ect upon a past that was rife with discord, shaped as it was by the long reach of colonialism. 152 Recent scholarship like Jean-Sébastien Boutet's study of the Innu and iron mining near Scheff erville illustrates how Indigenous communities adapted land use practice and took part in the wage labour economy, often on their own terms. 153 Nevertheless, there is still a tendency to characterize northern mining as a completely transformative activity aff ecting empty and unproductive landscapes. 154 As many Aboriginal communities have argued, reclamation can provide an opening to challenge these assumptions about the value of land, knowledge production, and development's legacies. 155 Northern mine reclamation policy must undergo a philosophical shift to refl ect this potential. In 1998, Brian Bowman and Doug Baker underscored how reclamation meant diff erent things to diff erent people, and such ambiguity persists to this day. 156 Many contemporary reclamation policies and laws exist because concerned community members challenged assertions and assumptions about mine closure. For example, when the Waswanipi Cree First Nation fought for the cleanup of abandoned mines in their territory in the late 1990s, they were frustrated that "remediation work" did not involve monitoring wet tailings or closing open shafts, while budget limitations prevented more extensive work. 157 Beyond clear hazards and pollution, mines continue to aff ect locals even after their closure, yet scientifi c and legal defi nitions of closure and reclamation only superfi cially account for the lived experiences of northerners. 158 Only emerging, locallydeveloped Arctic remediation strategies can address these dilemmas.
Conclusion
This article sought to unpack current Canadian mine reclamation policies and practices for legacy and new mines. Every northern region has its own reclamation policies, programs, and authorities; determining responsibility for a northern site's cleanup involves asking a series of questions about the site's location and history. As it stands, anemic linkages between diff erent authorities and the shaky incorporation of cumulative environmental impacts obstruct mine reclamation planning. Divergent reclamation programs and guidelines in each province and territory means that sites outside of one jurisdiction are eff ectively invisible to regulators in other places. This is especially problematic because reclaiming older and new mine sites in places like the Labrador Trough (located in both northern Quebec and Labrador) requires a cross-border approach. Reclamation projects in the North face a number of additional challenges, including integrating local knowledge, capacity building, and strengthening government oversight and enforcement. Eff orts to improve these processes through environmental reviews and other means take time, energy, and money, but are essential given that some reclamation works require management in perpetuity.
Pushed by legal challenges and Aboriginal eff orts to control their own lands, the policy landscape has evolved to imperfectly respond to some of the most pressing diffi culties of reclamation. Changes include reforms to existing mining legislation, more prescriptive reclamation guidelines, and programs for addressing liability issues and mitigating the health and environmental concerns at abandoned mines. However, as this article has argued, these many policies only address some of the inherent challenges of northern mine reclamation for both new and old mines. In general, they fail to adequately appreciate and respond to the complex socio-environmental problems those living near the mines have confronted for decades. To be truly eff ective, reclamation requires considering environmental harm and community health while recognizing the uneven power dynamics underlying mine siting, operations, and remediation standards.
If the goal of reclamation policy-making in northern Canada has been to remediate polluted sites and prevent the creation of new ones, then it has patently failed. This is in keeping with international trends. Despite the industry's focus on sustainable development principles, reclamation around the world has simply not kept pace with extraction. 159 Canada's failure can be att ributed to an unwillingness to embed and enforce strict reclamation standards and requirements not only within environmental policies, but also within mining acts and regulations fi rst drafted decades ago. With few exceptions, federal, territorial, and provincial governments have proven reluctant to strengthen reclamation policy or ensure industry compliance with existing rules and regulations. 160 In this, the North is not alone: the recent Mount Polley tailings spill in British Columbia reminds us that southern Canadian regulations, reporting requirements, and enforcement can be fallible, too. 161 Past eff orts to twin reclamation with other pressing public policy issues like debt reduction and urban redevelopment have succeeded only when championed by infl uential parties, as was the case for brownfi eld remediation beginning in the 1990s. 162 Recent mine abandonments like those of Jericho and Wolverine illustrate one of the current regime's greatest limitations: the distinction it draws between legacy mines and new ones. Not only is redevelopment "reanimating" legacy mines like Keno Hill, 163 but new mines are sometimes just as vulnerable to collapsing mineral prices and unenforced environmental regulations as their predecessors. Reclamation involves more than applying the most cost-eff ective technological solution and operating within the appropriate regulatory framework. Rather, it involves northern involvement through employment, leadership, and the integration of TK. It also invites renewed conversations about long-term sustainability and land use goals, as well as comprehensive plans for achieving these goals and prioritizing positive outcomes for local communities. 164 Instead of characterizing reclamation projects as technological undertakings wholly divorced from social and economic well-being, other considerations such as reparation and environmental justice are increasingly stressed and enforced within existing political mechanisms. In this way, some of the most damaging impacts of northern resource development can be at least partially mitigated. Nevertheless, legacy mine programs have yet to expand to cover more recent abandonments, while newly arranged devolution agreements transfer authority and responsibility for newer mines to territorial or regional governments regardless of these governments' limited capacity to fund these responsibilities. The current policy regime threatens to leave us with the same problems as before: massive public liabilities, enormous mitigation challenges, and communities trying to reconcile promises made and promises broken. For example, Vancouver-based Snowfi eld abandoned a diamond exploration site near Drybones Bay in 2014. Not only did Snowfi eld's directors choose to go ahead with advanced exploration without adhering to the environmental review process, but the security they posted is a fraction of the total anticipated reclamation costs. The company's fi nancial status suggests it is unlikely they will ever pay the full amount. "Snowfi eld A growing body of research traces the creation of contaminated sites through the industrialization of the North. Rather than treating Aboriginals as passive
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From 1989 onwards, the Mine Environmental Neutral Drainage national research consortium has reduced the impact of acid mine drainage. CanMET, a division of Natural Resources Canada, ensures regulatory decisions are based on "sound science," examines the community impacts of mining, and shares information and best practices with federal, territorial, and provincial regulators; some of its research is focused on reclamation-specifi c issues such as stabilizing tailings pond and the North. Natural Resources Canada has also led the Green Mining Initiative, an eff ort to reduce mining's environmental impact and expedite reclamation, particularly through revising waste practices and exploring secondary land use options. 
